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Abstract
Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one
possible world or another. They may di↵er in what they take possible worlds to be or in their
gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the
threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow
one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. Some of them concern
the interaction between propositions and worlds, and they appear to a↵ord the means to map
classes of propositions into propositions—or, likewise, classes of worlds into worlds—in a
one-to-one fashion that leads to contradiction. Yet another family of paradoxes threaten the
view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist, which is in line with modal realism, for
example. This article aims to survey and identify the source of each family of paradoxes as
well as to outline some responses to them.
1 Introduction
We often contrast what could merely the case with what is, in fact, the case. It is possible that the
election could have had a di↵erent outcoume. But what exactly is for this possibility to obtain?
Possible worlds accounts of modality explain the fact that the election could have had a di↵erent
outcome in terms of the fact that the election does, in fact, have a di↵erent outcome at some
possible worlds. More generally, they take a proposition to be possible if, and only if, it is true at
some possible world:
(^) It is possible that p if, and only if, the proposition that p is true at some possible world w.
Notice that the schema remains silent as to what is the nature of possible worlds or what is the
best way to understand what is for a proposition to be true at a possible world. Modal realism,
as developed by (Lewis 1986), takes possible worlds to be causally and spatiotemporally isolated
concrete universes. So, if it is possible that the election could have had a di↵erent outcome, then
there is a concrete universe, which is causally and spatiotemporally isolated from us at which
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we find the election to have a di↵erent outcome. However, the modal realist interpretation of
possible worlds talk is far from compulsory. Other philosophers have identified possible worlds
with states of a↵airs, (Plantinga 1976) and (Plantinga 1992)), propositions and classes thereof,
((Adams 1974)), possible states of the universe (Kripke 1980), and ways the universe might have
been (Stalnaker 1976).1
But whatever possible worlds may be, propositions are said to be true at them, and apparently
plausible principles concerned with the interaction between worlds and propositions are prone to
paradox. In this article, we survey two common examples. One paradox is a direct descendant of
Russell’s paradox of propositions, and it is premised on the existence of a one-one map from classes
of propositions into propositions. If there are possible worlds and propositions are true at them, then
each world should determine a class of propositions which contains, for each proposition, either it
or its negation. A Russell-style argument is supposed to lead to contradiction. The other paradox
seeks to derive the existence of a one-one map from classes of possible worlds into possible worlds
from eminently reasonable assumptions. And we will again be led to contradiction unless we find
a way to resist the existence of such a map.
A di↵erent family of paradoxes targets the view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist. While
this claim is not forced upon one by (^), it fits well with modal realism: when we open the range
of our quantifiers to vary over all there is, we find that they range over a plethora of merely possible
objects as well as actual ones. We will explore ways in which such an expansive ontology is prone
to paradox.
Before we survey each family of problems, we introduce three themes that will recur across the
formulation of di↵erent di culties.
2 The Toolkit
First, three set-theoretic preliminaries. One concerns the alleged distinction between sets and
classes, another is a general device for cardinality comparisons, and the last one concerns ap-
plications of set theory in non-mathematical contexts.
2.1 Sets and classes
One of the morals of the set-theoretic antinomies is that there is no set of all non-self-membered
sets. And yet, we find it almost irresistible to speak of the collection of non-self-membered sets.
1See (deRosset 2009a) and (deRosset 2009b) for a survey of possible accounts of modality.
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The distinction between sets and classes is supposed to accommodate such talk. Sets and classes
are sometimes conceived as collections, but some classes are collections that are too large to form a
set, e.g., the class of all non-self-membered sets; they are called ‘proper classes’. Like sets, classes
are extensional: if two classes have di↵erent members, then they are di↵erent. But, unlike sets,
classes are never members.
Classes, when conceived as set-like objects other than sets, are a source of perplexity: sets have
elements and classes have members; sets are themselves elements of sets and members of classes,
but classes themselves are never members of anything. One question at this point is what exactly
bars the formation of further collections of classes. And a second question is how exactly to square
the existence of proper classes with the thought that set theory is the most comprehensive theory of
collections.
On the other hand, classes have their uses in set theory: they allow one to turn some axiom
schemata—such as separation and replacement–into single axioms; they play a crucial role in the
motivation and formulation of certain large cardinal axioms; and they are often invoked in set-
theoretic argumentation.2 Fortunately, there is no need to take talk of classes at face value in order
to enjoy the benefits they bring with them.
Set theorists often prefer to paraphrase talk of classes in terms of satisfaction, and they take a set
to be a member of the class if, and only if, it satisfies an open formula of the language of set
theory. Unfortunately, this interpretation is not su ciently general to accommodate all uses to
which classes are put in set theory, though it is all we need to show that a class has strictly more
subclasses than members.3 Alternatively, we may understand singular quantification over classes
as shorthand for plural quantification over their members; to speak of a class of all possible worlds
is to speak of all possible worlds in the plural, and to claim that a given world is a member of a
given class of worlds is to claim that it is one of them.
In what follows, we opt for the plural interpretation of class talk, which is su ciently general
for the purposes of this paper. While the metalinguistic interpretation is enough to underwrite
Kaplan’s paradox, for example, it turns out to be inadequate to make sense of Russell’s paradox of
propositions.
2See (Maddy 1983) for a classic discussion of the role of classes in set theory.
3In particular, it cannot accommodate impredicative classes specified by appeal to quantification over classes, even
though they play a role in the motivation of certain large cardinal axioms.
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2.2 Cantor’s theorem
We will be concerned with cardinality comparisons between collections of propositions and propo-
sitions, and, likewise, comparisons between collections of worlds and worlds. So, let us begin with
the question of how to compare the cardinality of two sets. In set theory, comparisons of cardinality
involve the existence of functions from one set to another. For example, two sets a and b are called
equinumerous if, and only if, there is a bijection between a and b. And a set a is less numerous
than another set b if, and only if, there is a one-one function from a into b, but not vice versa.4
Cantor’s theorem is often glossed as the observation that a set has strictly more subsets than ele-
ments. Given our definitions, this is tantamount to the claim that there is a one-one function from
a into Pa but not vice versa. We know of course that there is a one-one function f from a into Pa,
where f (a) = {a}. But there is no one-one function from Pa into a; otherwise, there would be a
function from a onto Pa, which is impossible.5
• Cantor’s theorem: If f is a function from a given set a to Pa, then f is not onto.
Assume f is a function from a toPa. Let d be a subset of a given by: {x 2 a : x < f (x),
which exists by the axiom of separation. d is not the image of any element of a under
f : if f (c) = d, for some c 2 a, then c 2 d i↵ c < f (c) i↵ c < d, which leads to
contradiction. It follows that f is not onto.
The proof of Cantor’s theorem takes place in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) but breaks down in
alternative set theories with a universal set such as, for example, Quine’s New Foundations (NF).6
Because NF allows for the existence of a universal set U of all sets, it is not di cult to check that
U has no more subsets than it has elements. We lack the space to discuss NF and related systems,
4Some definitions:
• A function f is a set of ordered pairs such that for all x, y, z, hx, yi 2 f and hx, zi 2 f , then y = z. We write
f (x) = y to abbreviate: hx, yi 2 f .
• f is a function from a to b i↵ the domain of f , i.e., {x : 9yhx, yi 2 f }, is a and the range of f , i.e., {x : 9yhy, xi 2 f }
is a subset of b.
• f is a function from a onto b i↵ f is a function from a to b and the range of f is identical to b.
• f is a one-one function from a into b i↵ f is a function from a to b and forall x, y in the domain of f , f (x) = f (y)
only if x = y.
• f is a bijection between a and b i↵ f is a one-one function from a onto b.
5If f is a one-one function from a into b, then the inverse function f  1 would be a function from b onto a. The inverse
function, f  1, of f is defined: f  1(y) = x i↵ f (x) = y.
6Quine proposed NF in Quine 1937, and no contradictions are known to follow from it. However, the axiom of
choice is known to fail in it.
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but it should perhaps be noted that some philosophers have recently turned to Quine’s framework
in order to seek refuge from some of the problems to be discussed below. Three recent examples
of this strategy are (Oksanen 1999), (Cocchiarella 2000), and (Cantini 2004).
In standard set theory, Cantor’s theorem settles the question of whether a set has more subsets
than elements, but it does not speak to the question of whether a class has more subclasses than
members. There is, however, a generalization of Cantor’s theorem according to which a class has
indeed strictly more subclasses than members. One di culty at this point is that given a class A,
there is no sense to be made of the class of all subclasses of A, since, unlike sets, classes themselves
are never members. Moreover, even if we generalize the definition of a function to allow for certain
classes of ordered pairs to count as functions, there is still no sense to be made of a function from
A to subclasses of A.7 The problem, in short, is that we seem to lack the resources to make sense
of a class-valued function, one which assigns classes to sets.
(Bernays 1942) explained how to code a class-valued function by means of a relation, which pairs
a member of the domain with every member of the class we choose to assign to it. Now, a relation
is just a class of ordered pairs, and a class-valued function from a given class A to subclasses of A
becomes a relation that pairs a member a of A with each member b of the class B assigned to a. We
may even write R(b) = B to abbreviate: 8x(hb, xi 2 R$ x 2 B).
Bernays’ generalization of Cantor’s theorem for classes is the observation that no class-valued
function from a given class A onto subclasses of A will be onto: given such a class-valued function,
there is, on pain of contradiction, a subclass D of A not assigned to any member of A.
• Bernays’ theorem: If R is a class-valued function from a given class A to subclasses of A,
then R is not onto.
Assume R is a class-valued function from A to subclasses of A. Let D be a subclass
of A given by: {x 2 a : hx, xi 2 R}, which exists by an axiom of predicative class
comprehension.8 Now, D is not the image of any element of A under R: if R(d) = D,
for some d 2 A, then hd, di 2 R i↵ d 2 D i↵ d < R(d) i↵ hd, di < R, which leads to
contradiction. We conclude that R is not onto.
By way of illustration, Bernays’ theorem tells us that even if there is a proper class of possible
worlds, there are still strictly more classes of possible worlds than there are possible worlds. If
7A functional class F is a class of ordered pairs such that for all x, y, z, hx, yi 2 F and hx, zi 2 F, then y = z. We
write F(x) = y to abbreviate: hx, yi 2 f . The definitions given in footnote 4 can be generalized for functional classes in
a straightforward way.
8The axiom schema of predicative comprehension generates the existence of a class of members satisfying an open
formula A(x) of the language of class theory without any bound class variables.
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every class of possible worlds determine at least one proposition, then, by Bernays’ theorem, there
are strictly more propositions than there are possible worlds.
2.3 Impure sets and classes
Cantor’s theorem, and Bernays’ generalization, take place in a formal framework in which all
quantification ranges over sets and classes, never individuals. In the absence of individuals, all
elements of a set are sets, all elements of their elements are sets, etc: sets are pure, and classes
contain only pure sets as members. In what follows, however, we will look at contexts in which
quantification over individuals is not only permitted, but required. We will draw a contrast between
individuals, which are elements but never contain elements, and sets and classes. Individuals are
called ur-elements, and we will make allowance for impure sets and classes.9
Do the ur-elements form a set? Suppose that possible worlds, for example, are ur-elements. Then,
if there is no set of them, then there is a proper class of ur-elements. This, however, may be thought
to be in tension with the iterative conception of set. On the iterative conception, sets are formed
in stages. Stage 0 consists of all ur-elements like chairs, tables, and possible worlds, and at stage
1, we form all sets of ur-elements; in general, at a successor stage, we form all sets of sets formed
at the immediately preceding stage; and at a limit stage, we form sets of sets formed at preceding
stages of the iteration.
The iterative conception explains why there is no set of all sets: sets are formed at stages, but there
is no stage in the iteration at which all sets are ever available for collection. So, there is never
occasion to form a set of all sets. Unfortunately, no such iterative explanation is available when it
comes to the question of why there is no set of all ur-elements. They are, after all, available at the
very first stage of the cumulative hierarchy. So, it is not uncommon to take the iterative conception
of set to motivate the hypothesis that the ur-elements form a set:
The Ur-element Set Axiom: There is a set of all ur-elements.
In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC), this requires the ur-elements to be few in num-
ber and to be measured by some Cantorian cardinal number. But (Menzel 2014) has recently
explored a modification of ZFCU intended to accommodate the existence of “wide sets”, which,
while formed at low stages of the cumulative hierarchy, are not “mathematically determinable”.
The axioms of replacement and power set, in particular, are appropriately restricted in order to
accommodate them.10
9A set will be impure if it is not pure, e.g., it contains ur-elements as elements, as elements of elements, etc.
10Replacement is restricted to the claim that, roughly, only the range of an operation F on mathematically deter-
minable sets determines a set. The axiom of power set is similarly stated as the claim that for every set a, there is a
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However, strictly speaking, the iterative conception only requires that sets be formed in stages; it
does not mandate the formation of a set of all ur-elements. How could the ur-elements fail to form
a set, you ask? In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC), one may prove that every set
is equinumerous with the set of predecessors of an ordinal, which suggests an alternative account
of proper classes: proper classes are too numerous to be in one-one correspondence with the set
of predecessors of an ordinal.11 One model for the failure of the class of possible worlds to form
a set would be one in which they are indeed too numerous to be equinumerous with the set of
predecessors of an ordinal.12
On this picture of the cumulative hierarchy, stage 0 consists of a proper class of ur-elements—at
least as numerous as the class of ordinals. Call a collection set-sized if, and only if, it is equinu-
merous with the set of predecessors of an ordinal. At stage 1, we form a set of ur-elements for
each set-sized collection of them—notice, in particular, that we will not have occasion to form a
set of all ur-elements. In general, at successor stages, we form a set for each set-sized collection of
sets formed at immediately prior stages. At limit stages, we form a set for each set-sized collection
of sets formed at earlier stages. At the end of the day, all proper classes are too numerous to be
equinumerous with the set of predecessors of an ordinal.13
We lay out two final reasonable hypotheses. One the the thought that if A and B are too classes,
then they are comparable in size, i.e., one is at least as numerous as the other.
Cardinal Comparability: If A and B are two classes, then there is a one-to-one map from one
into the other.
In the context of a theory of classes over ZFC, Cardinal Comparability is equivalent to the hypoth-
esis that all proper classes are equinumerous.14
set which contains all and only the “mathematically determinable” subsets of a. The proposal requires two more ax-
ioms intended to enforce the existence of a partition of the universe into ranks and the thought that only mathematically
determinable sets admit an increase in cardinality.
11Since a von Neumann ordinal is identical with the set of its predecessors, this could be put in terms of a one-one
correspondence with a von Neumann ordinal.
12There are, in addition, precedents for the failure of ur-elements to form a set in (Barwise 1975) and (Faithful
Representation in Set Theory with Atoms).
13For a formal model, let  is the first strongly inaccessible cardinal and let U is a set of ur-elements. We write P<(X)
to refer to the set of all subsets of X of cardinality strictly less than , we define:
U>0 = U;
U>↵+1 = U [ P<(U↵);
U>  =
[
↵< 
U↵, for   a limit ordinal.
This construction yields a model of second-order ZFC with ur-elements on which there is no set of ur-elements.
14This is a special case of the result stated below in which we start with an empty class of ur-elements.
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Maximality: All proper classes are equinumerous.
Matters change a little when we allow for ur-elements. Maximality does not follow from Cardinal
Comparability in the context of a theory of classes over Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice
and ur-elements (ZFCU), unless we assume that there are at least as many ordinals as there are
ur-elements.15
3 Possible worlds and paradox
We now discuss two general threats for (^). One is a descendant of Russell’s paradox of proposi-
tions, while the other has come to be known as Kaplan’s paradox. Russell-style arguments are quite
general, but they are open to the same response as Russell’s original argument. Kaplan’s paradox
comes in at least two forms, and it requires quite a di↵erent response.
3.1 Russell’s Paradox of Propositions
As developed in (Russell 1903), Russell’s paradox of propositions involves three plausible princi-
ples:
(R1) For each class of propositions C, there is a proposition pC , e.g., every proposition in C is
true, which is associated with it.
(R2) If C and D are two di↵erent classes of propositions, then pC is di↵erent from pD.
(R3) There is a class of propositions R, which consists of all and only propositions p such that
p = pC for some class of propositions C such that p < C.
Russell derived an outright contradiction from them:
If R is the class of propositions described by (R3), let pR be the proposition associated
with it, which exists by (R1). First, observe that pR 2 R: otherwise, if pR < R, then
pR would be associated to a class to which it does not belong, namely, R, which would
make pR a member of R after all. Second, now that we know pR 2 R, note that, by
definition of R, pR = pC for some class C to which pR does not belong. Since pR 2 R,
C , R, which contradicts (R2).
Although Russell speaks of “classes of propositions”, we need not assume that they form a proper
class. If there is a set of all propositions, then (R1) and (R2) will already contravene Cantor’s
15Similar textbook claims are discussed in (Rubin and Rubin 1985). (Uzquiano 2014) outlines a proof in the appendix.
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theorem, since they entail the existence of a one-one function from the power set of the set of all
propositions and the set of all propositions, i.e., a one-one function which maps each and every set
of propositions into a proposition. On the other hand, if there is a proper class of propositions, then
Bernays’ theorem provides another route to Russell’s conclusion: (R1) and (R2) are true, then we
should be able to specify a class-valued function, R, which pairs a class of propositions onto all
classes of propositions. In particular, if pC is the proposition associated with the class C, then for
all q, hpC , qi 2 R only if q 2 C.16
What to do? It is not very plausible to deny (R1): no matter what a class of propositions may be,
we should be able to predicate something of it, e.g., that every one of its members is true. To avoid
contradiction, we may attempt to reject one of (R2) or (R3).
Russell himself considered the first option. He noticed that (R2) collapses if we identify materially
equivalent propositions: if p and q are two di↵erent propositions, then {p, q} and {p, q, p{p,q}} will
be two di↵erent classes associated with one and the same proposition.17 The proposition that
every proposition in {p, q} is true is, after all, materially equivalent to the proposition that every
proposition in {p, q, p{p,q}} is true. But as Russell observed:
[...] such an escape is in reality impracticable, for it is quite self-evident that equivalent
propositional functions are not identical. Who will maintain, for example, that “x is
an even prime other than 2” is identical with “x is one of the Charles II’s wise deeds
or foolish sayings”? Yet those are equivalent if a well-knonw epitaph is to be credited.
Matters improve a little when we adopt a more reasonable standard for the individuation of propo-
sitions: necessary equivalence. If you think that propositions are classes of possible worlds, for
example, then you will thereby identify necessarily identical propositions and (R2) will simply
become false: if p and q are two di↵erent propositions, then {p,¬p} and {q,¬q} will be two dif-
ferent classes to which one and the same proposition corresponds, namely, the impossible propo-
sition. But maybe the identification of necessarily equivalent propositions is overkill. The moral
of Russell’s paradox of propositions might just be that, contrary to expectations, some propositions
cannot assert something of a class of propositions without thereby asserting the very same thing
of a di↵erent class of propositions. This realization should ideally fall out of a reasonable account
of propositions, but, in the meantime, it may simply be regarded as a logical constraint on how
fine-grained we can coherently take propositions to be.
16If a proposition q, is not a proposition associated to any class of propositions, then q is not the first component of
any ordered pair in R and we may think of R as encoding a class-valued function on which q is assigned the empty class
of propositions.
17p{p,q} is the proposition: every proposition in the class {p, q} is true.
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The alternative is to reject (R3), which is an impredicative instance of a class comprehension
schema. The reason (R3) is impredicative is that it involves quantification over classes of proposi-
tions. There are at least two main options at this point. One option is to restrict the schema of class
comprehension to predicative conditions in which no bound class variables are allowed to occur.
Russell’s argument collapses once (R3) is withdrawn on account of its impredicativity.18
There is an alternative objection to (R3) recently explored in (Deutsch 2014). As John von Neu-
mann conceived of the distinction between sets and proper classes, it was a distinction between
members and non-members: unlike sets, proper classes cannot be members of other classes.
(Deutsch 2014) suggests that we can profitably extend the distinction between members and non-
members to the case of propositions. What we learn from Russell’s paradox of propositions, ac-
cording to (Deutsch 2014), is that, like proper classes, some propositions cannot be members. They
are non-members. (R3) is false because it overlooks the fact that many propositions fail to be mem-
bers. When appropriately restricted, a weaker counterpart of (R3) should state that there is a class
of all and only propositions p such that (i) p is a member, and (ii) p = pC for some class of propo-
sitions C such that p < C. Call this class of propositions R . By (R1), there is a proposition pR 
corresponding to R . But Russell’s contradiction is averted on the assumeption that pR  can never
be a member of a class. In fact, (Deutsch 2014) turns the Russellian argument into a proof that pR 
is a non-member.
This response fits well with the construal of classes as set-like objects other than sets. But given
the o cial stance we have adopted in this paper, this solution to Russell’s paradox of propositions
comes at a very high cost. To speak of a class of propositions is merely to speak of them in the
plural, and, likewise, to be a member of a class of propositions is merely to be one of them. So, for
a proposition to be a non-member is for it to never be able to count as one of some propositions.
But how could there not be some propositions of which a given proposition p is one? Does p itself
not constitute a plurality of which p itself is one?
Neither response to Russell’s paradox of propositions is cost-free, but the real concern is that mod-
ern descendants of the paradox have been used to cast doubt upon the coherence of possible worlds
accounts of modality of the sort mentioned in the introduction. To rehearse a version of the prob-
lem, notice that proponents of the schema (^) tend to speak of propositions, and while they di↵er
as to how best to conceive of them, they often agree on two minimal constraints propositions and
18Russell’s paradox of propositions is structurally analogous to Russell’s derivation of a contradiction from Frege’s
Axiom V according to which every concept determines an extension to which exactly its instances belong. But it is now
known that there are consistent predicative fragments of Grundgesetze, and the arguments for the consistency of Axiom
V against the background of predicative restrictions of second-order comprehension can be transposed mutatis mutandis
to the case of (R1) and (R2) against the background of predicative class comprehension. The consistency of predicative
fragments of Grundgesetze has been discussed in (Parsons 1987), (Heck 1996), and (Ferreira and Wehmeier 2002).
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worlds ought to satisfy:
(P1) Each proposition p has a negation ¬p.
(P2) If p is a proposition and w is a possible world, then either p is true at w or ¬p is true at w.
Call a class C of propositions maximal if, and only if, for each proposition p, either p is a member
of C or ¬p is a member of C. And call a class C of propositions compossible if, and only if, it is
possible that every proposition in C is true. Given (P1) and (P2), (^) seems to lead to:
(P3) If w is a possible world, then the propositions that are true at w form a maximal compossible
class of propositions.
One is now in a position to deploy a variant of Russell’s paradox of propositions in order to argue
that it is incoherent to suppose that there are any maximal compossible classes of propositions. In
particular, one argues for the inconsistency of four apparently plausible principles:
(M1) There is a maximal compossible class M of propositions.
(M2) For each class C of propositions in M, there is a proposition pC associated with C, e.g., the
proposition that every proposition in C is true.
(M3) If C and D are di↵erent classes of propositions in M, then the four propositions pC , ¬pC ,
pD, and ¬pD are pairwise di↵erent.
(M4) There is a class of all propositions p such that p is either pC or ¬pC for some class C of
propositions in M.
The argument is closely related to Russell’s derivation of a contradiction from his premises.
By (M2), consider the proposition pR associated with the class R, which exists by
(M4). We argue that both pR is a member of R and pR is not a member of R. First,
pR 2 R, Otherwise, if pR < R, then pR satisfies a su cient condition for membership
to R, whence pR 2 R. Now, that we know that pR 2 R, by definition of R, there is some
class C of propositions in M such that pR is either pC or ¬pC but pR is not a member
of C. But since R and C di↵er by at least one member, namely, pR, by (M3), pR is
di↵erent from pC and ¬pC . Contradiction.
One may now take this argument to provide us with a reductio of (M1), which would spell trouble
for any possible worlds account of modality on which every world determines a maximal compos-
sible class of propositions.
Now, there is no question that the argument is a reductio of something, but it’s hard to see what
exactly. (Deutsch 2014) suggests it is a reductio of the claim that every proposition is a member,
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whereas we have suggested it is a reductio of a very fine-grained conception of proposition. Su ce
it to say, for present purposes, that the argument will be powerless against a coarse-grained con-
ception of propositions on which one identifies necessarily equivalent propositions. If necessary
equivalence is su cient for propositional identity, then there is prima facie no motivation whatever
for the likes of (M3) and the di culty is avoided. And even if more fine-grained conceptions of
propositions are wanted, you may still take the problem to provide us with a logical constraint on
granularity: propositions cannot be as fine-grained as to validate the likes of (M3).
3.2 Kaplan’s Paradox
(Kaplan 1995) observed that (A) is unsatisfiable against the background of a possible worlds model
theory for intensional logic:
(A) 8p^(Qp ^ 8q(Qq$ (p = q))).
If, like Kaplan, we interpret the sentential operator, Qp, to mean: “it is wondered whether it is the
case that p” or “p is queried” for short, then (A) states that for each proposition p, it could be the
case that p, and p alone, is queried. Kaplan himself conceived of it as a di culty for the standard
possible worlds model theory for intensional logic: (A) is unsatisfiable, when it should not be ruled
out by logic alone. A model generally interprets propositional quantification in terms of objectual
quantification over sets of possible worlds in the model. Since ^B is true at a world in the model
just in case B is true at some world in the model, the satisfiability of (A) would require, for each
set of possible worlds, a world to bear witness to the possibility that the corresponding proposition,
and it alone, be in the extension of Q at a world. And this in turn is inconsistent with Cantor’s
theorem according to which there are strictly more sets of possible worlds than there are possible
worlds in the model.19
Kaplan’s observation has often been turned into a cardinality problem for (^). If the possibility that
a given proposition p, and p alone, is queried requires a possible world at which p, and p alone, is
queried, then (A) contravenes Cantor’s theorem. If possible worlds form a set, then they will have
19(Deutsch 2014) o↵ers a di↵erent take. One route to the unsatisfiability of (A) looks at the class of possible worlds
K = {w : 9p(w |= 8q(Qq $ (p = q)) ^ w 2 p)}. Now, let pK be a propositions, which is true at all and only worlds in
K, e.g., 8w(w |= pK $ w 2 K). By (A), there must be some possible world w such that w |= 8q(Qq $ (pK = q)). But
w |= pK only if w 2 K, which means that w 2 pK . Contradiction. We can now incorporate a distinction between members
and non-members. At most, we are entitled to the class K  = {w : w is a member^9p(w |= 8q(Qq$ (p = q))^w 2 p)}.
We may still consider the proposition p K , which is true at all and only worlds in K
 . Now, there is no possible world w
such that w |= 8q(Qq $ (pK = q)). For such a world w, if it existed, could not be a member. But if w is not a member,
it is not, in particular, not a value of a function from propositions into truth values. So, it is not a world at which a
proposition can be true.
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a certain cardinality , and we may then argue:
(K1) There are exactly  possible worlds.
(K2) For each set of possible worlds S , there is at least one proposition p, which is true at exactly
the worlds in S .
(K3) There are at least 2 propositions, and 2 >  by Cantor’s theorem.
(K4) For each proposition p, it is possible that p, and p alone, is queried at a time t by A.
(K5) For each proposition p, there is a possible world at which p, and p alone, is queried at time t
by A.
(K6) There are at least 2 possible worlds, contradicting (K1).
Three clarificatory remarks are in order. First, note that the problem doesn’t require the identifi-
cation of propositions with possible worlds. (K2) only requires that every set of possible worlds
determine at least one proposition; matters are hardly better if we allow a set of possible worlds to
determine more than one proposition.
Second, notice that (K4) comes from (A), when Qp is read: “p is queried at t by A,” and the
transition to (K5) is motivated by (^). The final step relies on the observation that no world can
bear witness to the possibility that each of two propositions p and q are the only proposition being
queried at time t by A.
Third, and lastly, Kaplan’s paradox is not avoided merely by denying the existence of a set of all
possible worlds. The problem remains on the assumption that possible worlds form a proper class:
(L1) There is a class of possible worlds.
(L2) For each class of possible worlds S , there is at least one proposition p, which is true at
exactly the worlds in S .
(L3) There are strictly more classes of possible worlds than possible worlds, by Bernays’ theorem.
(L4) For each proposition p, it is possible that p, and p alone, is queried at a time t by A.
(L5) For each proposition p, there is a possible world at which p, and p alone, is queried at time t
by A.
(L6) There are no more propositions than there are worlds, and, by (L2), there are no more classes
of possible worlds than there are propositions.
(L7) There are no more classes of possible worlds than there are possible worls, contradicting
(L3)
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What gives? (Lewis 1986)—which is independently committed with the existence of a set of
possible worlds—denies the assumption that each set of possible worlds is eligible as the content
of a mental state. If propositions are indeed identified with sets of possible worlds, then Lewis’
solution is to reject (K5) and suggest instead that there are independent reasons to think that the
majority of propositions are uneligible to give the content of a mental state. This is premised on his
analytic functionalism in the philosophy of mind; for him, a mental state can only be said to have
a certain content if it plays a certain functional role in the mental life of the agent.20 Since there is
no prima facie plausibility to the assumption that there is anything like continuum many functional
roles, let alone, more functional roles than there are possible worlds, there is no reason to assume
that each and every proposition could correspond to one functional role or another.
But Lewis’ response doesn’t reach the root of the problem. Maybe the reason some sets of possible
worlds are ineligible to provide the content of a mental state is that they are utterly unpatterned
and heterogeneous; they are not even eligible as the set of possible worlds that provide the truth
conditions for a sentence of natural language. However, we needn’t resort to vastly miscellaneous
sets of worlds in order to produce a counterexample to (A). For consider the following simple
sentence:
(L) Every proposition queried at t by A is false.
If (L) expresses a proposition at all, then it is a proposition pL, which is true at a world w if, and
only if, every proposition queried at t by A is false. Now, notice that there is no prima facie obstacle
for someone other than A to query pL at a given time. She may even query pL, and pL alone, at
the very time t mentioned in the sentence. But A herself, in contrast, will never be in a position to
query pL, and pL alone, at t:
(i) If pL is true, then if pL is queried at t by A, then pL is false.
(ii) If pL is queried at t by A, then pL is false.
(iii) If pL is queried at t by A, then some proposition q queried at t by A is true.
(iv) If pL is queried at t by A, then some other proposition q is queried at t by A.
It appears to follow that A can only query the proposition expressed by (L) at t if A queries some
other proposition at t. So, we have the makings of a counterexample to (A). And if (A) is abandoned
as hopeless, then Kaplan’s paradox is no longer a reason for abandoning (^). Kaplan himself is
aware of the di culty, but he thinks we should put the blame squarely on the assumption that there
is such a proposition as pL—and not on (A).
20See (Lewis 1986), pp. 106-107.
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To rehearse the point more formally, we may begin with an observation from (Prior 1961), which
is codified by a theorem of quantificational propositional logic:
(P) Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ p) ^ 9q(Qq ^ ¬q).21
Prior’s observation is perfectly general, but it becomes all the more remarkable when we interpret
the sentential operator Q by means of a propositional attitude such as “it is asserted”, “it is won-
dered whether”, “it is hoped that”, etc. For example, if, like Prior, we interpret Q to mean: “it is
asserted by a Cretan”, then (P) says that the proposition every proposition asserted by a Cretan
is false can only be asserted by a Cretan if a di↵erent proposition is asserted by a Cretan. Logic
alone appears to rule out the scenario in which a Cretan asserts the proposition every proposition
asserted by a Cretan is false, and nothing else.
Kaplan’s paradox is only two steps removed from Prior’s theorem in an appropriate intensional
logic. The rule necessitation in combination with existential generalization quickly yields the in-
consistency of an immediate consequence of (A):
(A⇤) 8p^(Qp ^ 8q(Qq$ (p$ q))).22
This principle appears to make quite a weak demand on possibility: for each proposition p, it is
possible that p, and only propositions materially equivalent to p, be queried. So, (^) no longer
requires di↵erent possible world to serve as a witness for di↵erent possibilities corresponding to
di↵erent propositions; one and the same world can bear witness to many such possibilities. And
yet, by minimal extension of Prior’s reasoning, (A?) is outright inconsistent.
In response to similar worries, David Kaplan suggested a ramified vision of propositions on which
they are classified into various orders in accordance to their subject matter. First, we begin with
21The proof is straightforward:
1. Q8p(Qp! ¬p! (8p(Qp! ¬p)! ¬8p(Qp! ¬p)) Universal instantiation
2. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! ¬8p(Qp! ¬p) From 1 by propositional logic
3. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! Q8p(Qp! ¬p) ^ ¬8p(Qp! ¬p) From 2 by propositional logic
4. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ ¬q) From 3 by existential generalization
5. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ q) From 2 by quantificational logic
6. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ q) ^ 9q(Qq ^ ¬q). From 4 and 5 by propositional logic
22The rule of necessitation allows one to move from a theorem B to its necessitation: ⇤B. Here is the argument:
1. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ q) ^ 9q(Qq ^ ¬q) Prior’s Theorem
2. Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ ¬(8p(Qp! ¬p)$ q)) From 1 by quantificational logic
3. ⇤(Q8p(Qp! ¬p)! 9q(Qq ^ ¬(8p(Qp! ¬p)$ q))) From 2 by necessitation
4. 9p⇤(Qp! 9q(Qq ^ ¬(p$ q)) From 3 by existential generalization
5. ¬8p^(Qp ^ 8q(Qq! (p$ q))) From 4 by quantificational logic
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propositions of level 0, which are concerned with purely extensional matters like, to borrow Ka-
plan’s illustration, distributions of earth, wind, fire, and water. Then we form propositions of level
1, which are concerned with purely extensional matters and propositions of level 1. Then we form
propositions of level 2, etc. Once one opts for ramification, we find that a propositional variable of
a given level may only range over propositions of a lower level, and one should find appropriate
replacements for axioms like universal instantiation.23
Ramification gives Kaplan the resources to block both Prior’s theorem and the alleged inconsis-
tency of (A⇤), but it is not without costs. To mention just one, ramification bars absolute general-
izations over propositions; when one asserts, for example, that every proposition is true or false, one
should not take the very proposition being asserted to lie in the range of the universal propositional
quantifier. So, logical generalizations must have appropriately restricted scope.
Given the choice between (A) and the severe expressive limitations incurred by ramification, one
may well take the moral of Kaplan’s paradox to be that an apparently plausible principle is, on
reflection, not only false but simply inconsistent. Once (A) ceases to exert any pull on us, we may
eventually come to terms with Kaplan’s observation.
4 Paradox and possibilia
We now shift focus to accounts according to which whatever could exist does, in fact, exist. I utterly
lack the expertise to assemble the parts of a motorcycle, and it is safe to assume that no motorcycle
has ever been, or will ever be, built by me. However, had I had the expertise, I could have assembled
various materials into a motorcycle. Since there could have a motorcycle assembled by me, there
is, in fact, a possible motorcycle assembled by me. The thought that we should admit such merely
possible objects into our ontology turns out to be prone to paradox.
David Lewis and Timothy Williamson are two philosophers, who have defended variants of the
thought in print. According to (Lewis 1986), when we quantify unrestrictedly over all that exists,
we quantify over merely possible objects as well as actual ones. For Lewis, to claim that a motor-
cycle could have been built by me is to claim that a concrete motorcyle is built by a counterpart of
mine at a concrete universe causally and spatiotemporally isolated from our universe. This concrete
motorcycle lies in the range of the unrestricted quantifer, which justifies the claim that there is a
possible motorcycle built by me.
23One is, for example, barred from making the inference from 8p(Qp ! ¬p) to Q8p(Qp ! ¬p) ! 8p(Qp ! ¬p)
on the grounds that the initial propositional quantifier in 8p(Qp ! ¬p) is intended to range over propositions of a
strictly lower level than the proposition expressed by 8p(Qp! ¬p).
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TimothyWilliamson is independently committed to the view that whatever could exist does, in fact,
exist. His reasons, however, are di↵erent: he endorses the universal generalization of the Barcan
Formula of quantified modal logic:
^9x B! 9x^ B (BF)
Since it is possible that something is motorcycle assembled by me, something is, in fact, possibly
a motorcycle by me. Unlike Lewis, however, Williamson distances himself from the further claim
that a merely possible motorcycle built by me is a concrete motorcycle made out of suitable metal
parts and pieces; a merely possible motorcycle is not even a motorcyle, but rather a non-concrete
object, which could have nevertheless been a motorcycle.
4.1 Recombination and paradox
One di↵erence between modal realism and other possible worlds accounts of modality lies in
Lewis’ ambition to provide a reductive account of modality: in particular, his account of possi-
ble worlds is meant to remain free from any modal idioms by reducing talk of possible worlds to
talk of spatiotemporally and causally isolated concrete universes. But whether or not the identifica-
tion helps vindicate (^), will require the assurance that the domain of possible worlds is su ciently
rich and varied to ground all possibilities.
The principle of recombination, inspired by the Humean dictum that there are no necessary con-
nections between distinct existences, is supposed to provide such an assurance. A first pass at the
principle is the claim that anything can co-exist with anything else, and, likewise, anything can fail
to co-exist with anything else.24 But since, according to Lewis, individuals are world-bound, con-
trary to this crude attempt at recombination, individuals drawn from di↵erent worlds never co-exist
at any world. To deal with this obstacle, Lewis recommends a formulation of recombination in
terms of duplication:
Unrestricted Recombination: Given some individuals, there is a world that contains any
number of duplicates of any of them.
(Forrest and Armstrong 1984) raises a challenge for a certain form of recombination on the grounds
that it is inconsistent with the existence of a set of possible worlds, and, a fortiori, a set of possibilia.
Since possible worlds are objects, every world in the set of possible worlds is subject to recombina-
tion. So, they consider a possible world which non-overlapping copies each of the original worlds
as parts. They later take such a world to be strictly larger in size than itself, which is absurd. Their
target, however, appears to be the following principle:
24This is Lewis’s initial gloss of the thought behind recombination in (Lewis 1986).
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Unrestricted Recombination without Overlap: Given some individuals, there is a world that
contains any number of non-overlapping duplicates of any of them.
Their argument amounts to this:
(F1) Nomatter what some possible worlds may be, there is a world which contains non-overlapping
duplicates of each of them.
(F2) There is a world, which is strictly larger in size than itself.
The existence of a world containing non-overlapping duplicates of each world, they think, leads to
(F2), which is absurd. But this last step requires subsidiary argument. Let World be a world which
contains a duplicate of each world in the set of all worlds:
(i) The set E of electrons in World has cardinality .
(ii) For each non-empty subset of E, there is a possible world at which exactly them enjoy a
certain quality Q.
(iii) Since there are exactly 2 1 non-empty subsets of E, there are at least 2 1 electrons in World,
which contradicts (i) above.
The last step in the argument is justified by the fact that the relevant duplicates of the possible
worlds generated by each non-empty subset of E do not overlap, and they each contain at least one
electron, which is part of World.
Unfortunately, as (Nolan 1996) observes, (ii) is objectionable as it stands: at most, we are entitled
to the claim that for each non-empty subset of E there is a world at which exactly duplicates of
them enjoy a certain quality Q. But once we shift the focus to such worlds, there is no longer reason
to think that there should be at least one possible world for each subset D of E. One possible world
w could bear witness to the possibility that exactly a duplicate of e enjoys Q, for each e; for the
only such electron at w could itself be a duplicate of each and every electron in World. So, one
world will do for all singleton subsets of E, one world will do for all doubleton subsets of E, etc.
So, there is still no reason to expect more possible worlds than electrons in World.
Even if the Forrest-Armstrong argument fails to refute the existence of a set of possible worlds,
there is still a simple argument from Unrestricted Recombination to the conclusion that there is
no set of possible objects. The argument, given in (Nolan 1996), makes use of the following
consequence of unrestricted recombination:
(N) For each cardinal  and for each object, there is a world with at least  duplicates of it.
The key now is to notice that (N) is incompatible with the existence of a set of possible objects:
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If there is a set S of all possibilia, then some cardinal  is the cardinality of S . By
Cantor’s theorem,  < 2, but, by (N), there is a possible world with 2 duplicates of
a given object. Since they all are possible objects, recombination requires the set S of
possibilia to have cardinality 2 > , which contradicts the initial assumption that S
has cardinality .
One may perhaps hope to resist (N) by falling back to Lewis’ qualified version of recombination:
Recombination: No matter what some objects may be, there is a world that contains any
number of duplicates of any of them size and shape permitting.
The point of the qualification is to make sure recombination does not generate unwanted possibili-
ties as to the size and structure of spacetime. As Lewis conceives of the principle, recombination is
concerned with the question of what objects can exist quite apart from the question of what are the
constraints on a possible spacetime. The qualification is not very informative; there is no reason to
think spatiotemporal manifolds could not include more than four, or seven, or finitely many dimen-
sions. The hope, however, is that there is some restriction on the size of possible spatiotemporal
manifolds, which can nevertheless accommodate all the possibilities (^) demands.
To the extent to which (N) is not an immediate consequence of Recombination, one may hope to
fend o↵ the commitment to a proper class of possible objects. On the other hand, nothing in Lewis’
statement of recombination precludes the truth of similar principles according to which, for each
cardinal , there could be at least  objects of kind K.25 Alternatively, one could follow (Menzel
2014) and make changes elsewhere in the set-theoretic framework and making allowance for the
existence of “wide sets” that are too large to be measured by a cardinal number.
More recently, (Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011) have argued that the likes of (N) threaten to raise
a more serious challenge for modal realism when combined with plausible mereological assump-
tions. Call a kind K disperse if, and only if, a fusion of objects of kind K is identical to a fusion of
some objects of kind K only if the former objects of kind K are the same as the latter; otherwise,
call the kind non-disperse. The kind portion of clay, for example, is non-disperse because a fusion
of two portions of clay may be identical, for example, to a fusion of four portions of clay, each
of which are proper parts of the original two portions. On the other hand, the kind person may
reasonably be assumed to be disperse, since a fusion of persons will be identical to the fusion of
some persons if and only if the former persons are the same as the latter.
(Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011) are concerned with principles like this:
(H) For each cardinal , there is a world with at least  angels.
25One way to see this is by noting that nothing in Recombination rules out the possibility of co-location.
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The possibility of angel co-habitation makes (H) plausible even in the face of unexpected con-
straints on the possible cardinality of the set of spacetime regions.26
However, like (N) before, this principle delivers a proper class of angels, many of which may be
only merely possible. This, by itself, should not be cause for alarm, since we have made allowance
for possible objects to form a proper class. Rather, the problem with (H) is that it seems incompat-
ible with two reasonable assumptions:
Unrestricted Composition: No matter what some objects may be, there is a fusion of them.
Maximality: All proper classes are equinumerous.
Unrestricted Composition, for Lewis, allows one to fuse objects from di↵erent worlds. But, since
the kind angel is disperse, we know that di↵erent classes of possible angels have di↵erent fusions,
which, in turn, tells us that there are at least as many fusions of possible angels as there are classes
of possible angels. By Bernays’ theorem, we know that there are strictly more classes of possible
angels than there are possible angels, which means that there are strictly more fusions of possible
angels than there are possible angels. Unfortunately, we already had a proper class of possible
angels, which means that the class of fusions of possible angels is strictly larger in size than the
class of possible angels, contradicting Maximality.
In the face of this, it looks like we must reject (H) as well as similar principles for other disperse
kinds: if K is non-modular, then there is some cardinal , we know not which, such that it is just
not possible for there to be  objects of kind K.
Some of the problems with recombination have been specific to Lewis’ framework, but the last
two issues are quite independent from the specific details of modal realism and generalize to a
metaphysics of modality in which we allow for quantification over merely possible objects. In par-
ticular, they generalize to the modal metaphysics espoused by (Williamson 2013). Let us consider
the first problem first. (Sider 2009) has explained how to generalize the di culty in Williamson’s
framework. There is, of course, no reason to think that Williamson would accept (N) as stated,
since it concerns the existence of a possible world with duplicates of a given object. There is,
however, a di↵erent plausible principle with similar consequences:
(N^) For each cardinal , it is possible that at least  individuals exist.
Remember that the thrust of the Barcan Formula is that what can exist does, in fact, exist; if it
is possible for there to be an individual, then there is a possible individual; by the ncessity of
26There is nothing special about angels. Certain kinds of elementary particles would have done just as well; bosons,
for example, are elementary particles with integral spin, which are generally thought to be able to co-habit a point-sized
region.
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distinctness, if it is possible for there to be two di↵erent individuals, then there are two di↵erent
individuals; and, more generally, if it is possible for there to be  di↵erent individuals, then there
are at least  di↵erent possible individuals.27 Since (N^) tells us that there is no upper bound
on the possible cardinality of individuals, there is no upper bound on the cardinality of possible
individuals. It follows that there is no set of all possible individuals; they form a proper class.
For a generalization of the second problem, consider the principle:
(H^) For each cardinal , it is possible that at least  angels exist.
An appropriate generalization of the Barcan Formula delivers again a proper class of possible
angels. But now, if the kind possible angel is disperse, then there are strictly more fusions of
possible angels that there are merely possible angels. This, like before, contravenes Maximality,
since we would seem to have specified two di↵erent proper classes that are not equinumerous.
One way out, of course, is to confine composition to avoid the commitment to fusions of merely
possible angels. Since, unlike Lewis, Williamson takes merely possible objects to be non-concrete,
one might restrict composition to the realm of the concrete. On this view, we would have a princi-
pled reason to resist the existence of strictly more fusions of possible angels than possible angels.28
Still, there is no denying that this comes at a cost.
5 Conclusion
Modal paradox threatens possible worlds accounts of modality, but they are far from decisive. Mod-
ern descendants of Russell’s paradox of propositions can be resisted, provided one takes proposi-
tions to be su ciently coarse-grained as to be in a position to resist that di↵erent classes of propo-
sitions must be associated with di↵erent propositions; some propositions can only assert something
of a class of propositions if they assert the same thing of a di↵erent class of propositions.
Kaplan’s paradox presents a powerful challenge of its own, but it need not lead to the rejection of
(^), provided one is prepared to relinquish (A) in the face of its inconsistency. The fact that logic
alone appears to require the rejection of a substantially weaker principle is further evidence against
(A); moreover, the very inconsistency of (A) suggests that the problem does not even require to
analyze possibility in terms of truth at one possible world or another. The problem persists for
philosophers, who reject (^) and nevertheless find (A) attractive.
We have surveyed, in addition, the threat of paradox for the thought that whatever could exist does,
27See (Sider 2009) for a rigurous regimentation of the argument.
28(Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011) discusses some other responses as well.
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in fact, exist as it arises for two di↵erent variants of the view. We found that one is soon led to
the existence of a proper class of merely possible worlds, which turns out to be in tension with
Unrestricted Composition and Maximality. Though none of the problems constitutes a decisive
refutation of the thought, they all seem to require some uncomfortable choices.
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